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Dual Distribution and Attempted Monopolization
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act
The marketing process is a major phase of business management.
Corporations have great impact at the consumer level. Effective market
penetration is a goal for which all major companies strive. One of the
most common marketing schemes is known as dual distribution. This
marketing system takes various forms, but for purposes of discussion
it will be limited to one type. A manufacturer of a product frequently
establishes distributorships owned by private individuals. A good example is an automobile producer. The maker of the car sells the
finished product to an independently-owned dealer who resells it to
the consumer. A dual distribution system exists when a distributorship,
owned and capitalized by the manufacturer is also established. The
independent dealership competes with the so-called "company-owned
store" for the retail sales of the manufacturer's product.
Dual distribution is favored in some industries while not favored in
others. Generally, the automobile manufacturers do not wish to establish dual systems for marketing cars. The manufacturer lacks the expertise to effectively operate on the retail level. The problems
presented by retailing are not hastily assumed by an auto maker. Dual
distribution is an unwanted necessity borne of declining market shares
or the inability of an independent dealer to profitably operate in a
particular area. This fact is verified by the few number of companyowned dealerships which exist.
Independent distributors view dual distribution through eyes glaring
with discontent. More competition for retail sales is not something for
which they wait with bated breath. In the automobile industry, independent distributors complain the company-owned stores are recipients
of favorable financing arrangements with the manufacturer. Capital
contributions from the manufacturer to the wholly-owned subsidiary,
allegedly used for advertising expenses, have raised the anger of the
independent dealers. The general complaint is the purported advantageous treatment received by the company-owned stores as a result of
their affiliation with the manufacturer. These advantages, as seen by
the independent dealers, enable the company-owned stores to unfairly
compete for retail sales because they can run at a loss but still be
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profitable in the long-run for the manufacturer. The competitive effects
of dual distribution are the source of many aggravating moments for
a privately capitalized distributor. The non-integrated dealers have
looked to the antitrust laws for relief. Their aim has been to sue the
manufacturer for the allegedly anti-competitive effects produced by
the establishment of the dual distribution system.
For purposes of analyzing the application of the antitrust laws to
the establishment of a dual distribution system, it is helpful to consider
a model problem. An automobile manufacturer, for example, previously
established an independent dealer in a metropolitan area. Subsequently, the dealer ran into financial problems and was forced out of
business. The car manufacturer was faced with the decision of replacing
the old dealer or losing that share of the retail market. Replacement
of the dealership was the preferred choice. Because the old dealer had a
difficult time in that location it may be hard to immediately find a
person willing to invest his money in a private dealership. Further, the
start-up costs for a dealership are significant. Considering these factors,
the manufacturer decided to replace the old dealer with a wholly-owned
subsidiary. It was hoped a private dealer could be found in the near
future.
The near-by independent dealers still in existence wish to attack the
establishment of the dual system under section 2 of the Sherman Act.'
They allege the manufacturer is attempting to monopolize the retail
sales of its product by creating the retail subsidiary.
This problem represents a direct attack on the system of dual distribution. Section 2 may or may not apply. Only close scrutiny of the
relevant case law will remove doubt.
The former head of the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division,
Richard W. McLaren, characterized the government's attitude toward
application of the antitrust laws to dual distribution programs. 2 Before
the House of Representatives Subcommittee on the Activities of Regulatory Agencies Relating to Small Business, Mr. McLaren said:
In our opinion, dual distribution is not, and should not be
made, unlawful per se. By operating in this manner, manufacturers are often able to achieve significant economies which re1. Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), makes it unlawful for any
person to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of trade or commerce among the several
states. ..

2.

"

BNA ATRR NEWS X-1 to X-5 (No. 453 March 17, 1970).
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dound to the benefit of the consuming public. Moreover, in a free
enterprise system, businessmen should remain free to alter their
methods of distribution in accordance with the demands of changing economic circumstances. 3
In terms of art of the Sherman Act, Mr. McLaren expressed the view
that no "restraint of trade" should be found to exist, within the meaning of section 1 of the Sherman Act, when a manufacturer establishes a
dual distribution system. Indeed, no courts have held dual distribution
' 4
is a "restraint of trade.
In testifying before the same House Subcommittee, McLaren also
said:
A manufacturer could decide to convert completely to a system
of distributing through its own outlets without necessarily violating the antitrust laws, even though such a change would result in
a loss of business to firms which had formerly acted as the manufacturer's distributors.
On the other hand, there are circumstances in which a manufacturer's attempts to engage in dual distribution may very well
violate the antitrust laws. .

.

. [A]ttempts by partially integrated

manufacturers to engage in predatory pricing, i.e., pricing designed
to drive competitor-distributors from the market, are subject to
challenge as an attempt
to monopolize in contravention of Section
5
2 of the Sherman Act.

The substantive offenses of section 2 are monopolization, attempt to
monopolize, and conspiracy to monopolize. In the model for analysis,
the independent dealer could claim the manufacturer had monopolized
the retail sales of the cars sold by the dealer, and produced by the
manufacturer, by establishing a dual distribution system. The charge
of monopolization would be made if the degree of forward integration
by the manufacturer had reached an advanced level. The charge of
monopoly is assumed not to have been made in the model problem.
Monopoly power has been described as the power to raise prices and
exclude competition. 6 In the automobile industry it is clear no single
3. Id. at X-2 to X-3.
4. Only "unreasonable" restraints of trade are illegal. United States v. Standard Oil
Co., 221 U.S. 1 (1911). Some restraints are illegal per se, such as price fixing and horizontal
divisions of territory. Id. Other restraints are illegal only if they fail to pass the "rule
of reason" test. In applying the rule of reason to a particular restraint, courts will consider (a) the facts peculiar to the business, (b) the nature and effect of the restraint, (c) the
history of the restraint, (d) the evil thought to exist, (e) the reason for implementing the
particular remedy, and (f) the purpose sought to be attained by the restraint. Chicago
Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
5. BNA ATRR NEWS, supra note 2, at X-2.
6. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
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manufacturer has this power. Ford cannot raise its prices much higher
than Chevrolet without losing a significant number of retail sales. And,
General Motors does not control enough of the car industry to be able
to exclude Chrysler from any given area of the country.
The charge to be argued most vigorously by plaintiff in the model
action is attempt to monopolize. To prove an attempt to monopolize,
the plaintiff must show the defendant had a specific intent to gain
monopoly power in the relevant product market, and acts, pursuant to
that intent, which create a "dangerous probability" of successful mo7
nopolization.
Since the acts done pursuant to the intent to monopolize must be
appraised within the relevant market, the starting point in analyzing
an attempt to monopolize is to define that product market. The leading
case in this area is United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. 8
Dupont was charged with monopolizing the market in cellophane. The
trial court found the relevant product market to be flexible packaging
materials in general, not just cellophane. The complaint was dismissed
and the United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower court action.
In determining how to define the relevant product market in duPont,
the Court said:
[N]o more definite rule can be declared than that commodities
reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes
make up that 'part of the trade or commerce,' monopolization of
which may be illegal. 9
As this language indicates, the essence of the relevant product market
under section 2 is interchangeability of products. Interchangeability
exists if the consumer is willing to substitute one product for another
without having to experience great discrepancies in price, use, or appearance of the commodities. If, on an objective basis, it can be said
one product is functionally similar to another, both products will be
included in the same relevant product market for purposes of measuring monopoly power.
It is difficult to argue with the proposition that all cars have enough
similarities to be classified in the same product market for purposes of
7. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Co., 382 U.S. 172 (1965); Allen
Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. John A. Denie's Sons Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.)
73,955 (W.D. Tenn. April 13, 1972); Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1972
Trade Cas.)
73,896 (D. Ariz. March 15, 1972).
8. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
9. Id. at 395.
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determining antitrust violations. The reasons why a consumer chooses
to buy a Chevrolet, rather than a Ford product, usually involve personal preferences, financing arrangements, dealer-customer relations,
and other considerations, all of which do not involve significant differences in the quality of the two cars.
The Supreme Court, in duPont, recognized almost no manufacturers product, by itself, can be a relevant product market:
A retail seller may have in one sense a monopoly on certain trade
because of location, as an isolated country store or filling station, or
because no one else makes a product of just the same quality or
attractiveness of his product, as for example in cigarettes. Thus
one can theorize that we have monopolistic competition in every
nonstandardized commodity with each manufacturer having power
over the price and production of his own product. However, this
power that, let us say, automobile or soft-drink manufacturers have
over their trademarked products is not the power that makes an
illegal monopoly. Illegal power must be appraised in terms of the
competitive market for the product. 10
The holding in duPont, that the relevant product market for an
attempt to monopolize is defined in terms of interchangeability, has
been recited in several recent decisions. In Bushie v. Stenocord Corp.,"
plaintiff charged defendant with section 2 violations in the market of
Stenocord dictating machines. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, in affirming the trial court's grant of defendant's motion for
summary judgment, rejected plaintiff's definition of the relevant product market. The market was not limited to Stenocord products but
included all dictating machines.
To the extent that Bushie's argument suggests that the "relevant
market" to be used in considering Stenocord's market share is to
be arrived at by disregarding those other sellers of dictating equipare similar, both in design and function
ment whose products
12
... we reject it.
In Cal Distributing Co. v. Bay Distributors, Inc.,'8 defendant was
charged with attempting to monopolize the market in United Vintners
wines. The district court specifically referred to duPont and held the
wine market in general was the relevant market. After discussing the
test of interchangeability set forth in duPont, the district court said:
10. Id. at 392-93.
11.

5 TRADE REG. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.)

12.
13.

Id. at 91,720.
337 F. Supp. 1154 (M.D. Fla. 1971).

73,896 (D. Ariz. March 15, 1972).
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As can be seen from facts set out above and below, United Vintners
wines face direct competition from numerous other brands of
wines, especially Gallo wines. The relevant product market in this
case, i.e. the "commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes," is all wine distributed in the
relevant geographic market.1 4
The relevant product market in the model will be the car industry
in general. The same principle of interchangeability of the major
manufacturers' products will prevent a producer from being guilty of
an attempt to monopolize his own product. Even the acts by a car
maker pursuant to his attempt to gain complete control over the distribution of his own product are not prohibited by section 2 of the
Sherman Act.
The decisions regarding attempts to monopolize an automobile manufacturer's own product conclude no violation of the antitrust laws is
involved, except in rare circumstances to be discussed later.
In Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co.,1 5 the manufacturer-defendant eliminated one private dealership so he could grant
to another dealer the exclusive right to sell Packard cars in Baltimore.
The district court submitted to the jury the issue of whether Packard
was guilty of attempting to monopolize the relevant market. The jury
found for the plaintiff. Post-trial motions by the defendant were denied.
The court of appeals reversed because it said no monopoly was possible
in Packard cars since they effectively competed with cars of other manufacturers.' 6 An illegal monopoly being impossible, no attempt to do
what is lawful could be prohibited by section 2. The court made it
clear since Packard competed against other, larger manufacturers of
cars, it would be unfair to prohibit it from effectively competing in
the Baltimore area.17 It was to Packard's business advantage to reorganize its distribution system. Effective competition in the car industry in general-the relevant product market-would be promoted,
rather than destroyed, by allowing Packard to control completely its
marketing scheme.
The District Court for the Western District of Texas, in Johnny
Maddox Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 1 8 clearly stated the reason why
14. Id. at 1158. See also Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957).
15. 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
16. Id. at 420.
17. Id. at 421.
18. 202 F. Supp. 103 (W.D. Tex. 1960).
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Ford cars could not be the relevant product market under section 2. In
granting defendant's motion for a summary judgment it was said,
quoting Arthur v. Kraft-Phoenix Cheese Corp.:19
Every manufacturer has naturally a complete monopoly of his
particular product especially when sold under his private brands,
and no private controversy with a distributor could legally tend to
increase that type of a natural monopoly.
The Sherman Act is,
20
therefore, clearly not really involved.
Madsen v. Chrysler Corp.,21 also held no attempt to monopolize one
car manufacturer's product is within the prohibitions of the Sherman
Act. The district court applied the duPont holding to conclude the
relevant product market was cars in general. It would be unrealistic to
find Chrysler-Plymouth dealers compete only with themselves for retail
sales in Chrysler cars. They compete actively with dealers of other
manufacturers for retail sales of all cars.
The language in the decisions discussed clearly leads to the conclusion that section 2 of the Sherman Act is not really applicable to the
model problem. When an independent dealer sues a car manufacturer
for monopolizing or attempting to monopolize the manufacturer's
product by establishing a dual distribution system, he may have a
variety of contentions. However, in all claims he ultimately reaches the
critical point of proving the relevant product market. As seen from
the case law, and from business practice, the relevant product, for an
independent car dealer's suit, will always be the car industry as a whole.
It cannot be the cars of a single manufacturer alone because one manufacturer's cars compete with those of all other manufacturers. Furthermore, a natural monopoly exists over one manufacturer's cars. Natural
monopoly power cannot be made illegal by practices which merely tend
to increase that power. In a case based purely on the practice of dual
distribution, where a manufacturer is charged with monopolizing, or
attempting to monopolize his own cars, the Sherman Act is not involved.
The same result has been reached in decisions dealing with practices
22
of manufacturers of other industries.
19. 26 F. Supp. 824 (D. Md. 1937).
20. Id. at 828.
21. 261 F. Supp. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
22. See E.A. Weinel Constr. Co. v. Mueller Co., 289 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Ill. 1968)
(involving construction supplies); United States v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 245 F. Supp. 737
(E.D.N.Y. 1965) (accidulants in food and beverages and acids in effervescent alkalizing
preparations); A-i Business Mach. Co. v. Underwood Corp., 216 F. Supp. 36 (E.D. Pa.
1963) (involving the market in business machines); Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 5 Tsuai
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Recently one case in the Western District of Pennsylvania has led to
some confusion in this area. Mt. Lebanon Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler
Corp.,2 3 includes language which is less than completely clear. Plaintiff
charged Chrysler with selling Dodge cars to its company-owned stores
at lower prices than it was selling them to the independent dealers in
Allegheny County. Other facts were averred which tended to show
company-stores were receiving advantageous subsidies which led to allegedly anti-competitive effects.
The district court started its process of confusion by stating Dodge
cars in Allegheny County were a significant enough "part" of commerce
to be the subject of a monopoly charge. 24 In terms of previous decisions,
this is certainly a conclusion of dubious legal validity. However, shortly
thereafter, the court seemed to correct itself by saying, as a matter of
law, because of the competition from other car manufacturers in Allegheny County, Chrysler could not be guilty of monopolizing the local
car industry. 25 When the charge of attempted monopolization of Dodge
cars in Allegheny County was considered, it was allowed to go to the
jury. Mt. Lebanon resulted in the confused holding that Chrysler could
not be guilty of monopolizing its own product, but could be guilty of
attempting to monopolize the relevant product market in Allegheny
County.
There are two ways in which Mt. Lebanon can be read. Because of
the confusing language it is not at all clear which reading was intended
by the district court. Although the court said Dodge cars in Allegheny
County are a "part" of interstate commerce which could be monopolized, it did not specifically say that was the product being considered
in the charge of attempt. If Mt. Lebanon is read to mean Chrysler can
be guilty of attempting to monopolize the market in its own product
it stands by itself in a long line of precedent holding the contrary. This
interpretation of Mt. Lebanon makes it incompatible with all previous
decisions concerning monopolization of one manufacturer's product.
It is difficult to assign validity to the opinion of Mt. Lebanon if it
means a car manufacturer can violate section 2 of the Sherman Act with
practices limited to the market in its own product. All other decisions
REG. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.)
73,896, at 91,717 (D. Ariz. March 15, 1972) (involving
dictating machines); Brewer Sewing Sup plies Co. v. Fritz Gegauf, Ltd., 1970 Trade Cas.
73,139, at 88,469 (N.D. Ill. April 3, 1970) (involving the sewing machine industry).
23. 283 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Pa. 1968), afJ'd per curiam, 417 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1969).
24. Id. at 460.
25. Id. at 461.
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in this area, as discussed before, hold the relevant product market in
such a case is the car industry in general.
Another way to read Mt. Lebanon is to say it holds evidence of price
cutting and advantageous subsidies from a manufacturer to a companyowned store raise a jury question as to whether the manufacturer
attempted to monopolize the entire car industry. This holding would
make Mt. Lebanon more consistent with previous decisions. 26 However,
it must be immediately recognized this type of action is not a case involving pure dual distribution practices. The model problem is based
on the independent dealer's complaint that the company stores unfairly
compete in the retail sales of the manufacturer's product. It is very
different to say the establishment of company-owned stores reveals anticompetitive practices in the car industry as a whole. The latter example
has not been discussed heretofore, and is completely separate from
the dual distribution problem described by the model. The model
involves an attack on the dual distribution system itself. The Mt.
Lebanon case may be read as a suit attacking a manufacturer's attempted
monopolization of the entire car industry whereby the system of dual
distribution was merely the vehicle incidental to the illegal attempt.
The distinction between a pure dual distribution case, involving a
charge of attempted monopolization of the manufacturer's product, and
a case involving the attempted monopolization of the industry in
general, is crucial. The result of not finding a violation of section 2
under the facts of the model problem does not mean a car producer,
or any manufacturer, may do anything it pleases regarding its own
product. If real anti-competitive practices take place, the manufacturer
may be guilty of attempting to monopolize the industry in general. For
example, an auto maker could open a retail subsidiary to replace a
failing independent dealership and begin selling its cars at $100 each.
In such a case there would be enough evidence to allow a jury to decide
whether the defendant was attempting to monopolize the entire car
industry. The problem of proving the relevant product market is not
the same as in the model problem. It is not intended the reader be left
with the impression that because the model describes no attempted mo26. It is unclear in Mt. Lebanon whether the court faced the issue of a dangerous
probability of monopolization. It is hard to imagine how, for example, Ford Motor Company, could come so close to monopolizing the entire car industry that its acts could
constitute a dangerous probability of success. If this element was not made out, the case
should never have gone to the jury, even if the relevant product market can be assumed
to be correct.
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nopolization, the manufacturer is free to do as it likes as long as it
confines its actions to the market in its own cars.
A pure dual distribution case is one involving a suit based on the
manufacturer's alleged anti-competitive practices in the market of its
own product. The cases discussed above do not mean a pure dual distribution case is never possible. They hold, however, in an industry
where several manufacturers compete, all producing interchangeable
products, the relevant product market cannot be limited to one of
those manufacturers' products. This rule of law leads one to consider
an industry in which only one manufacturer exists. The product of
such an industry would be so unique that no interchangeable products
compete with it. In such a situation, it is logical to expect the relevant
market, for purposes of the Sherman Act, to be determined by that one
manufacturer's product. However, this case differs substantially from
the model problem because the structures of the two industries involved
differ. The instances where a single manufacturer's product will, by
itself, constitute a relevant product market are indeed rare. A few cases
have shown the situation to exist, however, infrequently. 27
The most famous case holding a single manufacturer's product a
relevant market is United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms. 2s Although

this case was decided before duPont it can be easily reconciled with
the cases discussed above. This decision did not involve a problem of
dual distribution as set forth in the model problem. Klearflax Looms
had previously sold to Floor Products, Inc., a distributor. Klearflax
quit delivering linen rugs to Floor Products over a dispute concerning
which one would service a government contract. The Justice Department instituted suit alleging, among other things, that Klearflax had
illegally monopolized the sale of linen rugs. The district court had to
decide, as a matter of law, what was the relevant product market. Although some competition between linen rugs and other types was
bound to exist, Klearflax's product was unique in enough respects to
negate any possibility of significant interchangeability.
Undoubtedly, linen rugs compete with other floor coverings which
are available on the market and widely, distributed, but the evidence does establish that Klearflax rugs are unique and distinc27. Related to this consideration is the principle that a monopoly gained by
business acumen is not an illegal monopoly under the Sherman Act. Neither is a
which has been "thrust upon" a manufacturer by the inability of others to
compete in the industry. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966);
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
28. 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945).

exercising
monopoly
effectively
American
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tive. It is not without significance that the [government] contract
lists linen rugs separately from other floor coverings, and the govindicates their desireability, particularly for
ernment demand
29
public buildings.
The government quite apparently preferred Klearflax rugs and considered them as having distinctive advantages and qualities over other
types of floor coverings. The district court made it quite clear Klearflax Looms was not being sued for monopolizing the manufacture of
rugs in general.A0
In Bushie v. Stenocord Corp.31 the possibility of one manufacturer's
product constituting a relevant market was squarely addressed. In that
case Stenocord dictation machines were held not to be a market in
themselves. The reason for this holding is expressed in language which
also helps in understanding Klearflax:
A single manufacturer's products might be found to comprise by
themselves, a relevant market for the purposes of a monopolization
claim, if they are so unique or so dominant in the market in which
they compete that any action by the manufacturer to increase his
assures that competition in the
control over his product3 virtually
2
market will be destroyed.
Klearflax linen rugs were unique enough to constitute a relevant
product market by themselves. However, Ford or Chrysler cars are not
so unique. This fact explains why the relevant product market in
the model problem must be cars in general.
Another opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held if a
private antitrust plaintiff avers the proper facts, he must be permitted
to offer evidence at trial to show defendant's product constitutes a relevant product market because it is not interchangeable with other
products. This decision was made in reversing a grant of defendant's
motion for summary judgment in Industrial Building Materials v.
38

Interchemical Corp.

With regard to the section 2 charges, the Industrial opinion is very
confusing. Industrial Building first alleged Interchemical monopolized
the entire sealant industry. The affidavits from both sides, regarding
the structure of the sealant industry, raised questions of fact, according
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 39.
Id.
5 TRADE REG. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.)
Id. at 91,720.
437 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1970).

73,896 (D. Ariz. March 15, 1972).
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to the circuit court. Industrial also charged Interchemical, if not completing the monopoly, had attempted to monopolize the sealant industry. The confusion in the opinion came about when the court said,
34
for attempt to monopolize, no relevant product market is in issue.
However, immediately thereafter it was concluded because Industrial
had also alleged Interchemical's sealant product, Presstite, was so
unique as to constitute a relevant product market in itself, the plaintiff
should have an opportunity at trial to prove the allegation. Thus, while
denying the need to prove a relevant product market for attempt to
monopolize, the court twice discussed at some length the two possible
product markets raised by the plaintiff's allegations. Regardless of the
Presstite
confusion, Industrial was given the opportunity to prove
35
products were a relevant product market in themselves.
The conclusions to be gathered from all the cases discussed concerning dual distribution and section 2 of the Sherman Act are complicated
and difficult of explanation. In a situation such as the model problem,
where dual distribution is directly attacked as a monopolistic practice
or attempt to monopolize, section 2 will rarely be applicable. This is so
in an industry, such as the automobile business, where more than one
manufacturer's product compete for retail sales. The critical question
is always the relevant product market. In the car industry all cars compete for sales and no single manufacturer's product is unique enough to
be a relevant product market. Thus, the pure dual distribution problem
is not within the practices contemplated by the Sherman Act's prohibitions embodied in section 2.
If the independent dealer sues under section 2, alleging dual distribution was the vehicle by which the manufacturer monopolized or
attempted to monopolize the entire industry, the same problem of
relevant product market does not arise. However, such a case is not
one attacking the practice of dual distribution in and of itself. It
centers on the monopoly or attempt thereof, and the anti-competitive
effects on the industry in general. Dual distribution is an incidental
factor; a mere vehicle by which the illegal goals are sought to be accomplished.
34. This principle was first applied in Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th
Cir. 1964), where it held the relevant product market was not an issue to be discussed in
analyzing an attempt to monopolize. This case was not followed in a recent case decided
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 5 TRADE REc.
73,896 (D. Ariz. March 15, 1972). Its precedential value is not
REP. (1972 Trade Cas.)
very great.
35. 437 F.2d at 1345.
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The only time a purely direct attack on dual distribution can be
successful is if the manufacture in the action has a product which is so
unique it does not compete with any others. These cases will be extremely rare because a unique product line surely invites competition
from newly established firms or from older firms extending to new
manufacturing areas.
The cases discussed have been confused and cited for propositions
which are not based on intelligent readings. The principles of monopoly
and attempts to monopolize are based on the duPont decision. For
problems of dual distribution the same principles must be applied. A
court should not misread the case law in order to find for a small,
independent dealer because he represents the "underdog" in a battle
against a corporate giant. The public's right to more efficient distribution of a manufacturer's product is protected by the Sherman Act. The
federal courts cannot be turned into a theatre for unwarranted judicial
intervention into business decisions which comply with the laws of
competition promoted by the antitrust provisions.
THOMAS C. BLACK

